Current Case by Tsai, Judy C.
Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal




Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj
Part of the Law Commons
This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Judy C. Tsai, Current Case , 7 Santa Clara High Tech. L.J. 193 (1991).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj/vol7/iss1/6
ARE MUNICIPALITIES ENTITLED TO RECOVER
NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGES UNDER CERCLA?
Town of Bedford v. Raytheon Company, No. 89-2313-WD
(Dist. Ct. Mass. Jan. 15, 1991)
INTRODUCTION
On January 15, 1990, the United States District Court, District
of Massachusetts found that a municipality is not able to recover
natural resource damages pursuant to the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA") 42
U.S.C.A. sections 9601 to 9675.1 The court's position directly con-
flicts with prior interpretations endorsed by the District of New
Jersey and the District of New York.2 The court held that a munic-
ipality is not within the term "state" as used in CERCLA section
9607(a)(4)(C), which specifically authorizes states to maintain an
action for natural resource damages.3 Under this holding, not only
would a municipality be precluded from recovering natural resource
damages, but as a private party, would sustain the heavy burden
under section 9607(a)(4)(B) of proving response costs were consis-
tent with the national contingency plan.4
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1. Town of Bedford v. Raytheon Company, No. 89-2313-WD (Dist. Ct. Mass. Jan. 15,
1991) (1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 896).
2. See City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 633 F. Supp. 609, 618-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1986);
Mayor of Boonton v. Drew Chem. Corp., 621 F. Supp. 663 (D.NJ. 1985) (holding that
municipalities may bring damage actions as trustees of natural resources under CERCLA).
3. For the language of 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4)(C) (1980), see infra note 4. 42
U.S.C.A. § 9607(f)(1) (1980) further defines who may bring an action for loss to natural
resources:
In the case of an injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources under
subparagraph (C) of subsection (a) of this section liability shall be to the
United States Government and to any state for natural resources within the
State or belonging to, managed by, controlled by, or appertaining to such State
4. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9607(a)(4)(A)-(D) (1980) provide several avenues to obtain mone-
tary recovery for losses incurred in connection with the release of hazardous substances:
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for trans-
port to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by
such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes
the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Gov-
ernment or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national contin-
gency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consis-
tent with the national contingency plan;
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The significance of finding that the definition of "state" does
not embrace municipalities will have profound consequences if
other courts follow the decision. As owners of natural resources,
municipalities will not be able to protect their natural resources di-
rectly through natural resource damages.5 Instead, municipalities
will be forced to rely on state governments to specifically designate
them as trustees in order to protect natural resources within the
municipalities' own jurisdiction.6 This additional hurdle magnifies
the uncertainty which surrounds natural resource damages.7 The
Department of Interior has recently promulgated damage assess-
ment regulations to provide guidance in valuing natural resource
damages.8 However, parts of these regulations have been held inva-
lid when tested in court.'
If a municipality is not a "state," it may not maintain a CER-
CLA action under standards applicable to the federal and state gov-
eminent. Under section 9607(a)(4)(A), the United States
government or a state may recover response costs not inconsistent
with the national contingency plan.10 The national contingency
plan is a detailed federal promulgation of procedures and standards
to govern cleanup activities. The plan specifies the procedures,
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, includ-
ing the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting
from such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out under
section 9604(i) of this title.
5. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(16) (1980) of CERCLA broadly defines "natural resources" as
"land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water, drinking water supplies, and other such
resources belonging to, managed by, held in trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise controlled
by the United States .... any state or local government, or any foreign government."
6. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(f)(2)(B) (1980) provides:
The Governor of each State shall designate State officials who may act on be-
half of the public as trustees for natural resources under this chapter and sec-
tion 1321 of Title 33 and shall notify the President of such designations. Such
State officials shall assess damages to natural resources for the purposes of this
chapter and such section 1321 of Title 33 for those natural resources under
their trusteeship.
7. See generally In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings Re Alleged
PCB Pollution, 716 F. Supp. 676 (D. Mass. 1989); Ohio v. United States Dept. of Interior,
880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
8. 43 C.F.R. § 11 (1986).
9. See Ohio v. United States Dept. of Interior, 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989), which
struck key provisions of Dept. of Interior's regulations noting "a great deal of uncertainty
remains with respect to the proper method of assessing natural resource damages under
CERCLA."
10. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (1980) provides:
all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Govern-
ment or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national contin-
gency plan.
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techniques, materials, equipment, and methods to be employed in
identifying, removing, or remedying releases of hazardous sub-
stances. I I The federal government or a state need not prove that its
present and future costs are necessary and consistent with the na-
tional contingency plan. Rather, the burden shifts to opposing
counsel to prove any inconsistencies. However, as "any other per-
son" under section 9607(a)(4)(B), a municipality must affirmatively
demonstrate that all response costs were necessary and consistent
with the national contingency plan.'2
FACTS
The Town of Bedford, Massachusetts brought suit against
Raytheon Company, Massachusetts Port Authority, the U.S. De-
partment of the Air Force, and the U.S. Department of the Navy to
recover for natural resource damages for contamination of the
town's principal drinking water source. Bedford claimed that each
of the defendants engaged in activities that either used or generated
hazardous substances which contaminated sites owned or operated
by the defendants. The hazardous pollutants from the contami-
nated sites leached into the town's aquifer. Bedford alleged the aq-
uifer to be polluted by hazardous substances eliminating the town's
supply of potable water.
The defendants moved to dismiss Count II of Bedford's com-
plaint which sought natural resource damages under section 6907 of
CERCLA. The defendants argued that Bedford, as a municipality,
was not authorized to bring suit for natural damages. In response,
Bedford not only opposed the motion but sought by its own motion
for partial summary judgment. Although conceding its status as a
municipality, Bedford argued that it was entitled to the less de-
manding burden of proof applicable to states in a CERCLA cost
recovery action.
LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE
In finding that a municipality is not a state under CERCLA,
the court first looked to the definition of a state provided in CER-
CLA section 9601(27). That section states:
The terms "United States" and "state" include the several States
of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the United
11. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9605 (1980).
12. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1980). See supra note 4.
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States Virgin Islands, the Commonwealth of the Northern Marl-
anas, and any other territory or possession over which the United
States has jurisdiction. 13
The court distinguished municipalities from the entities listed in the
definition on the basis that the entities were all sovereigns, and un-
like municipalities, do not depend on states to grant them power.
Furthermore, the court looked at the definition of "person" under
Section 9601(21) and noted that that term did include "municipal-
ity" or other "political subdivision of a state." 1
4
CRITICISM OF PAST DECISIONS
The court did not end its analysis at this point because other
district courts have taken the directly contrary position that a mu-
nicipality is a "state" for purposes of recovery under CERCLA. In
Mayor and Board of Aldermen of the Town of Boonton v. Drew
Chemical Corp. (D.N.J. 1985)15 and City of New York v. Exxon
Corp., (S.D.N.Y. 1986),6 both courts relied on policy reasons for a
broad reading of the word "state" to assimilate municipalities
within its definition.1 7 The strongest policy argument adhered to by
the Drew Chemical and Exxon courts was the broad remedial pur-
poses of CERCLA to ensure prompt and effective cleanup of haz-
ardous wastes:
Since the statute (CERCLA) specifically includes within its am-
bit "natural resources" which are under control of local govern-
ments, the Act's broad remedial intention is not furthered by a
reading which requires the State, which is not the government
charged with managing and conserving these resources to bring
suit to recover for damages done to them. The clear purpose of
the Act, which is to ensure prompt and effective cleanup of haz-
ardous wastes and the restoration of environmental quality, is
not advanced by preventing the authorities entrusted with the
management of public resources from bringing actions to recover
the cost of protecting them.18
The court, however, emphasized that the framework of legislation
13. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(27) (1980).
14. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(21) (1980) defines "person" as:
an individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, consortium, joint
venture, commercial entity, United States Government, State, municipality,
commission, political subdivision of a State, municipality, commission, polit-
ical subdivision of a State, or any interstate body.
15. 621 F. Supp. 663 (D.N.J. 1985).
16. 633 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
17. 633 F. Supp. at 618-619.
18. 633 F. Supp. at 619.
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was also designed to restrain unwise and excessive clean-up activity.
This restraint was to be achieved by imposing a burden upon those
entities without the attributes of sovereignty to establish entitle-
ment. The court further relied upon the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) which set up a scheme
for states to designate "natural resource trustees" to bring natural
resource damage actions.19 Because SARA did not provide for mu-
nicipalities' automatic appointment as natural resource trustees, the
court concluded that Congress did not intend municipalities to re-
cover natural resource damages directly.
The court also addressed concerns which arise from the nature
of natural resource damages. The court found natural resource
claims of municipalities to be of regional concern and therefore,
subject to the parochial views of states' political subdivisions. Addi-
tionally, because of the unsettled and complex nature of natural re-
source damages, the court thought that only those trustees
designated by the Governor of each state should be allowed to bring
such claims in order to avoid inconsistent approaches by a range of
different plaintiffs with counsel of variable quality and experience.
Finally, the court dismissed Bedford's contention that the leg-
islative history of the SARA amendments supports the municipal-
ity's position. Adopting the language of City of Philadelphia v.
Stepan Chemical,20 the court without much discussion, concluded
that the SARA amendments were "inconclusive, indicating neither
an endorsement or for that matter, a rejection by Congress of the
Drew Chemical position."2 1 In summing up its position, the court
stated: The language and structure of CERCLA make clear that a
municipality is not a "state" as defined in the statute. Although
references to the overall philosophy of CERCLA and its "legisla-
tive history" can be tailored to suggest that a different definition
would be appropriate, such tailoring is not the proper way to ap-
proach construction of the statute. In light of the conclusion that
the words and structure of the statute make evident a congressional
intent to treat states differently in important ways from their munic-
ipalities or political subdivisions, the language of the statute must be
implemented.22
19. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(f)(2)(B) (1980). See supra note 6.
20. City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 713 F. Supp. 1484 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
21. City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 713 F. Supp. at 1489 n.15.
22. Town of Bedford v. Raytheon Co., No. 89-2313-WD (Dist. Ct. Mass. Jan. 15, 1991)
(1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 896, p. 10).
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MuNIcIPALmTES As NATURAL RESOURCE TRusTEEs
In light of Stepan Chemical and now Raytheon, it appears that,
at least in some jurisdictions, municipalities are barred from recov-
ering natural resource damages under CERCLA. However, the
language of SARA governs. SARA requires the governor of a state
to designate trustees entitled to bring natural resource damage ac-
tions.23 The issue of who are the appropriate trustees for state natu-
ral resource damage claims is still unanswered. The policy
arguments advanced by Drew Chemical and Exxon support the
finding that municipalities should be "natural resource trustees."
CERCLA would be anomalous if interpreted as giving states a
cause of action for damages to natural resources owned by the state
but not allowing the same cause of action for municipalities with
respect to their natural resources. This anomaly is especially appar-
ent in light of section 9601(16) which expressly includes natural re-
sources owned by "local governments" within the scope of
protected subjects.24 The court's fears that local governments
would be susceptible to "parochial views" and therefore unworthy
trustees are unfounded. Although the court sees natural resource
damages as a region-wide concern, owners of contaminated prop-
erty are in the best position to claim natural resource damages.
Municipalities recovering for damages to their natural resources
have the capacity and especially the inclination to clean up and con-
tain the contamination. A municipality's dependence upon the
state to bring an action on behalf of the municipality will result in
further delay to an already slow and complex process.
MUNICIPALITIES' BURDEN OF PROOF
The issue of requiring municipalities to sustain the heavy bur-
den of proving response costs were necessary and consistent with
the national contingency plan under section 9607(a)(4)(A), may
have been rendered moot by SARA. SARA places new limits on
the permissible uses of natural resource damage awards. The new
limits prohibit the use of the Superfund to pay for restoring natural
resources. Consequently, natural resource trustees must now look
to parties responsible for the contamination, and not the Superfund
to finance restoration efforts. Additionally, some courts have held
that if parties are not seeking reimbursement from the Superfund,
but rather directly from other parties whose activities caused the
23. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(f)(2)(B) (1980). See supra note 6.
24. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(16) (1980). See supra note 5.
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need for response, such costs do not need to be approved under the
national contingency plan and certified by the responsible Federal
official.25
CONCLUSION
A reasonable policy toward natural resource damage claims
consistent with the overall cleanup objectives of CERCLA must be
developed. CERCLA's enforcement scheme of achieving the clean
up of hazardous substance contamination can be furthered through
natural resource damages. Natural resource damages may be used
to finance resource restoration and replacement costs. Further-
more, because natural resources are often times very significant to
the public, we need the deterrent effect of natural resource damages
in precluding negligent contamination. Municipalities, as owners of
valuable natural resources such as aquifers and land, must be able
to protect their resources through a CERCLA natural resource
damage cause of action. It is difficult to understand why the state
should be entitled to recover damages for a loss or injury which the
municipality sustained. All the uncertainty that currently sur-
rounds a CERCLA natural resource damage action dampens most
efforts to pursue such a claim. The current decision by the Ray-
theon court compounds that uncertainty, leaving the door to natu-
ral resource damages barely open. Municipalities should be entitled
access to recover natural resource damages under CERCLA. Such
access will encourage and facilitate the cleanup and treatment of
hazardous wastes in order to protect and preserve natural resources
and public health.
Judy C. Tsai
25. Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 605 F. Supp. 1348, 1357 (D. Del. 1985);
City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 633 F. Supp. 609, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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